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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Payne appeals from the district court's Judgment, Suspended Sentence,
Order of Probation and Commitment. He asserts that the district court erred when it
prohibited Mr. Payne from presenting his defense that he did not have the requisite
intent to

possess

methamphetamine,

because

methamphetamine long enough to turn it into police.

he

only

had

control

of the

Mr. Payne has a constitutional

right to present his defense including a right to testify regarding his intent.

The

erroneous exclusion of this evidence violated Mr. Payne's due process rights and, as
such, his conviction must be vacated.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On February 12, 2010, an Information was filed charging Mr. Payne with
possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.13-14.) Mr. Payne entered a not guilty
plea to the charge. (R., pp.17-18.) The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.33-46.)
On the first day of trial, following jury selection, the State submitted an oral
motion in limine asking that Mr. Payne not be allowed to testify regarding "why he
possessed the alleged methamphetamine and what he was planning to do with the
methamphetamine" because such testimony was irrelevant.

L. 11.)

(Tr., p.77, L.7 - p.78,

Mr. Payne stated that his defense was going to be that he did possess

methamphetamine, but for a limited time and only to turn it in to law enforcement so that
it could be properly disposed of. (Tr., p.80, Ls.2-6.) The district court agreed that it
would hear additional argument at a later time if Mr. Payne did decide to testify.
(Tr., p.81, Ls.9-14.)
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At the start of the second day of trial, the State again browght up its motion to
keep Mr. Payne from testifying about his intent. (Tr., p.84, L.5 - p.91, L.6.) After some
limited additional discussion, the district court again ruled that it would not rule on the
issue in advance. (Tr., p.84, L.5 - p.91, L.17.)
The State's first witness was Detective Barclay. Detective Barclay testified that
on April 6, 2009, at about 10:00 p.m., Mr. Payne rang the doorbell at his house, seemed
very nervous, handed over a black container containing methamphetamine, and stated
that he did not want it. (Tr., p.109, L.7 - p.113, L.2.) The detective then told Mr. Payne
to leave and called in some on duty officers to collect the methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.113, L.5 - p.114, L.15.) The next day Detective Barclay packaged the evidence
and later delivered the methamphetamine to the Idaho State Police lab.

(Tr., p.114,

L.16 - p.116, L.22.) Detective Barclay explained that he did not deliver the substance
to the crime lab right way because he wanted to give Mr. Payne an opportunity to enter
into a cooperation agreement and get treatment, but Mr. Payne refused to enter into a
cooperation agreement. (Tr., p.129, L.3 - p.135, L.19.)
The State then presented the testimony of Officer Hawley who collected the
evidence from Detective Barclay and placed it into an evidence locker to be dealt with
later. (Tr., p.143, L.12 - p.148, L.22.) The State's last witness was Ms. Owsley, the
forensic scientist who preformed the testing used to confirm the substance was
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.157, L.15- p.170, L.7.) The State then rested. (Tr., p.177,
L.13.)
Prior to the defense presenting its case, the State again renewed its motion
arguing the defendant's proffered testimony would be irrelevant. (Tr., p.180, Ls.12-17.)
The State argued that there was no defense of necessity, duress, entrapment, mistake
2

of law, or mistake of fact. (Tr., p.180, L.22 - p.181, L.1.) Defense counsel then argued
that the State had presented testimony of three individuals that had possessed the
methamphetamine for legal purposes, that the State of Idaho has laws on point that
allow for citizens to help enforce the laws of Idaho. (Tr., p.181, L.22 - p.182, L.1.) The
district court then noted that if Mr. Payne was planning on arguing that since others (law
enforcement) had possessed it, the jury should not convict Mr. Payne, that it would not
allow it because it was not proper argument or testimony.

(Tr., p.182, Ls.9-19.)

Defense counsel then argued that,
if there's an exception that is in the hornbooks that is considered to be
regular use exception for law enforcement officers and lab analysts to
have this, then, if a citizen believes he is acting to help enforce the law, he
should be able to present that to the jury and have them review that.
(Tr., p.183, L.22 - p.184, L.2.)

The district court then stated that, "if that is your

defense, you're going to have to convince a higher court than this one that it's a proper
defense." (Tr., p.184, Ls.3-5.) The State asked for a clarification of the ruling asking
whether or not the defendant could testify to motives.

(Tr., p.192, Ls.15-17.)

The

district court stated that, "There's a difference between testifying as to what went on and
as to his motives. I guess I'll have to listen as the case proceeds, but my inclination is
to say that motive typically is not a defense to possession." (Tr., p.192, Ls.18-22.)
Mr. Payne then took the stand. (Tr., p.194, L.1.) Mr. Payne told the jury that an
individual pulled him over to talk, stated that he was not aware that a go-cart he had
recently acquired actually belonged to Mr. Payne and that he would do what he could to
get it back, and then threw a black container into Mr. Payne's car saying, "In the
meantime."

(Tr., p.196, L.4 - p.198, L.18.) Mr. Payne realized that the substance in

the black container was probably methamphetamine and thought, "What am I going to
do with it?" (Tr., p.199, Ls.7-22.) He knew he was near a drug officer's house so he
3

drove the few blocks to get there. (Tr., p.199, L.23 - p.201, L. 7.) Mr. Payne then went
to the door, contacted Officer Barclay, and handed him the methamphetamine, but did
not want to provide information about where he had obtained it. (Tr., p.201, L.3 - p.206,
L.16.) Mr. Payne testified that he went directly to Officer Barclay's house after having
the black container thrown into his car, that it took no more than five minutes, and that
he was too afraid to stop anywhere on his way there because he just wanted to get the
drugs away from him. (Tr., p.221, L.21 - p.222, L.8.)
On cross-examination, the State attempted to ask a question regarding
Mr. Payne's intent.

(Tr., p.209, Ls.6-9.)

Defense counsel objected stating that if

defense counsel was not able to ask about intent than the State also should not be able
to ask intent questions. (Tr., p.209, Ls.9-17.) The district court overruled the objection.
(Tr., p.209, Ls.22-23.) However, the question was never answered. (Tr., p.209, Ls.2225.)
The defense then rested. (Tr., p.223, Ls.1-2.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict (R., p.48.) Mr. Payne was later sentenced to a
unified sentence of seven years,_with three years fixed, suspended for a seven year
probationary term. (R., pp.59-66.) Mr. Payne filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the
district court's Judgment, Suspended Sentence, Order of Probation and Commitment.
(R., pp.67-69.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it failed to provide Mr. Payne a fair opportunity to present
his complete defense?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide Mr. Payne A Fair Opportunity To
Present His Complete Defense

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it prohibited Mr. Payne from presenting his defense

that he did have the requisite intent to possess methamphetamine, because he only had
control of the methamphetamine long enough to turn it into police and was acting as a
citizen to help enforce the law by delivering it to law enforcement. Mr. Payne has a
constitutional right to present his defense including a right to testify regarding his intent.
Mr. Payne's conviction must be vacated because the erroneous exclusion of his
defense and intent testimony violated his due process rights.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide Mr. Payne A Fair Opportunity
To Present His Complete Defense
The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 'This right
is a fundamental element of due process of law." Id. The right to present a defense
includes the right to offer testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to
present the defendant's version of the facts "to the jury so it may decide where the truth
lies."

Id.

In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), the United States Supreme Court

described what it regarded as the most basic ingredients of due process of law:
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic
in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a
right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel.
6

Id. at 273. When the defendant has been denied a fair opportunity to defend against

the charge, the conviction must be overturned.

State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671

(Ct. App. 2003).
Mr. Payne was denied the opportunity to present his defense to the charge of
possession of a controlled substance. Counsel represented that Mr. Payne's defense
was that he did not posses the requisite intent and that he was acting in a non-criminal
way to turn in the methamphetamine to police.

The district court entered a ruling

prohibiting Mr. Payne from presenting his defense, including presenting intent evidence.
(Tr., p.184, Ls.3-5, p.192, Ls.18-22.)
It was error for the district court to prevent Mr. Payne the opportunity to present
testimony regarding his intent and ultimately to present his defense to the charge. It
has been well documented law in Idaho for nearly a century that when intent is an issue,
a defendant is allowed to testify regarding their intent.
In 1914, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that:
We think there is no doubt that the authorities universally agree that
wherever the motive, intention, or belief of a person is relevant to the
issue, it is competent for such person to testify directly upon that point; or,
stated differently, when the motive of a witness in the performance of a
particular act or in making a particular declaration becomes a material
issue, he may himself be sworn in regard to it, notwithstanding the
diminished credit to which his testimony may be entitled as coming from
the mouth of an interested witness.
State v. Jones, 25 Idaho 587, 138 P. 1116, 1121 (1914). This rule is applicable to the

right to testify in civil, quasi criminal, and criminal cases. Id. The Jones Court held that
"it was error in the trial court to prevent the defendant from explaining any and all acts
by him done [related to the charge], and the refusal of the court to allow him to further
testify was prejudicial error against the rights of the defendant, for which this case
should be reversed." Id.
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A year later, the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253, 152 P.
1054, 1057 (1915), again found that it was reversible error in the trial court to prevent
the appellant from explaining any and all acts done by him with reference to the offense
charged. Id. The Givens Court relied in part upon the holding of State v. Johnson, 17
N. D. 554, 118 N. W. 230 (1908):
It is what the defendant actually meant that is the test of criminality, and
not what the express words may seem to convey when read by others.
We think the following expresses the correct rule as to the latitude to be
allowed on examination of those accused of crime while testifying: "He
must be permitted, on his direct examination, to explain his conduct and
declarations as he has testified to them, or as they have been described
by other witnesses. He must be permitted fully to unfold and explain his
actions, and to state the motives which he claims prompted them. It is
within certain limits relevant for him to state what intention was present in
his mind when he participated in a transaction which is in issue. And the
jury are the sole judges to determine whether the defendant's statement is
false. * * * They must consider it in connection with all the evidence. The
inference which they draw from it may be strong enough to overcome any
conclusion of guilty intention which they may draw from his other acts or
declarations."
Id.
In 1960, the Idaho Supreme Court again addressed a similar issue in State v.
Hopple, 83 Idaho 55 (1960). Hopple cited to Idaho Code§ 18-114 which, then and
now, provided that, "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint
operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." Id. at 59. The intent to steal was
an issue in the offense charged in Hopple. Although recognizing that it would be difficult
to define a rule governing the exact latitude to be allowed on examination of those
accused of crime while testifying, a defendant
must be permitted fully to unfold and explain his actions, and to state the
motive which he claims prompted them. Wherever the motive, intention or
belief of an accused is relevant to the issue it is competent for such
person to testify directly upon that point and if there is any reason to
suspect his candor, the jury may make all the allowance called for by his
position and demeanor. The question as to what the appellant believed
8

and intended was one of fact to be submitted to and determined by the
jury.
Id. at 59-60. The Hopple Court found that, "It is clear that appellant in the instant case
was likewise prevented from explaining his acts and intentions and we therefore
conclude that such denial is reversible error." Id. at 60.
Mr. Payne's case also demands reversal.

Idaho Code § 18-114 requires that,

"In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and
intent, or criminal negligence."

l.C. § 18-114.

Idaho Code§ 18-115 provides that,

"Intent or intention is manifested by the commission of the acts and surrounding
circumstances connected with the offense." I.C. § 18-115. Additionally, the jury was
instructed that, "In every crime or public offense, there must exist a union of joint
operation of act and intent.

Intent does not mean the intent to commit a crime but

merely the intent to knowingly perform the prohibited act." (Tr., p.225, Ls.10-13.) As
such, intent was an issue directly in front of the jury. Mr. Payne was prevented from
presenting specific testimony about his intentions.
Further, Mr. Payne was prevented from presenting his defense that he was
acting on behalf of law enforcement by turning in the methamphetamine.
Code§ 18-201 states that:
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to
the following classes:
1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under
an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent.
2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious
thereof.
3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design,
intention or culpable negligence.
4. Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed
the act or made the omission charged, under threats or menaces sufficient
to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives
would be endangered if they refused.
9

Idaho

I.C. § 18-201.

Under

I.C. § 18-201(3), Mr. Payne was not a person capable of

committing a crime as he committed the act of possessing methamphetamine through
the misfortune of having the substance thrown to him although he did not want it. He
did not have any "evil design" and did not intend to possess it under any traditional
theory, but instead had only the intent to dispose of it and remove it from his presence
in what he believed was a legal way, by acting on behalf of law enforcement and turning
it over to police as quickly as possible.
As such, the district court interfered with Mr. Payne's right to due process by
denying him the ability to present his defense, including testimony about his intent.
Accordingly, Mr. Payne's conviction must be vacated.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Payne respectfully requests that this court vacate his conviction and
remanded his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 2ih day of January, 2012.

ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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